Why was the expeditionary fighting vehicle cancelled

On the outside, a series of enviro-friendly coatings were used that avoided the use of carcinogenic hexavalent chrome, and areas where dissimilar metals are mated need barriers to prevent electricity-producing galvanic reactions. If that sounds more complex and exensive than standard IFVs, well, it is.

Beyond the difference in these variants, however, all EFVs had broad similarities in a number of areas. The EFV was designed to have positive buoyancy, and the program office has confirmed that the vehicle will float when at rest. Waterjet propulsion gives an amphibious speed of more than 20 knots — 3 times that of the AAV7.

This sea state capability would match the older AAV7s, and this level of unassisted armored landing capability in high sea states is reportedly unique to the AAV7 among present-day vehicles.

Maintenance and readiness are meant to be similar to vehicles like the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley, though they never even got close to that goal before the program was terminated. Measures have been taken to make EFV detection harder, including moving thermal giveaways to the rear, reducing telltale dust via side skirts, etc. NBC nuclear, biological, chemical protection is also included. In response to pressure from Congress, ideas have now been floated re: removable applique armor, but no official decision was taken.

The EFV program office never formally evaluated any of these systems, however, as no funding or requirements were provided to do it. Detonations underneath will remain a challenge, however, because the need for hydrodynamic lift forces a flat bottom design — and the same design that catches the full force of the water to provide lift, will also catch the full force of a mine blast. Given the amphibious distance and speed requirements, however, the EFV program office noted that blast-deflecting V-hulls were not an option.

Shock-absorbing seats that reduce spinal injuries were the best they could do, given the specifications. Given these uncertainties, the increasing use of AAV7 Amtracs as armored personnel carriers deep inland, and the trends toward urban warfare and IED threats, the EFV has attracted some criticism.

The biggest underlying requirement concerns the Navy, not the Marines. Rather than buying extra hovercraft or LCUs, the Navy and Marines wanted these waterborne abilities to be part of the vehicles themselves, so that amphibious assaults could introduce armor support very quickly.

That speed has 2 major tactical rationales. One is protection. The other is flexibility. To illustrate the implications of flexibility, imagine a release point 15 miles offshore. The U. As long as the opposite bank has a shallow enough slope for the EFVs to climb out within a few miles, EFVs can swim up rivers and cross water obstacles. He could also use the EFVs in security operations as a bridgehead and guard force, until engineers could bring the tanks across.

EFVs will be tied to heavier and less flexible forces because they cannot handle enemy tanks or IEDs independently, and they will be too vulnerable in the urban warfare scenarios that will be common features of future conflicts. Options to improve these capabilities, they say, will only turn a very expensive system that has demonstrated serious reliability problems, into an extremely expensive system that is even less reliable, and requires more support than before.

Other Marine forces like the British and Dutch, they note, are relying instead on smaller amphibious vehicles like the BvS Viking. When trying to keep the Navy ships safe, they argue, why not opt for systems like these that offer heliborne air mobility, giving the Marines even greater operational speed and over-the-horizon reach, and offering naval defenses even more shots at enemy missiles?

Alternatively, the Marines could buy a more conventional IFV with some amphibious capabilities, and depend on extra hovercraft, vessels like the proposed and landing ships to get them ashore. Armed with rockets, bolt-on RWS turrets, or even rolled-on armored vehicles, they would have new life as impromptu littoral and riverine patrol craft, policing terrain that the US military sees as high threat while keeping larger ships out of the picture.

DARPA may have added a 4th option, but like all DARPA projects, it will have to overcome significant technical hurdles in order to become even a potential production program.

The expected schedule was an ACV technical demonstration vehicle by the end of FY , and a fully operational demonstration vehicle done by the end of or Re-use of some EFV systems might help meet those deadlines, but reliability issues make that a riskier strategy than it might otherwise be.

A competition between contractors will give several of them years to build their offerings, followed by a chosen ACV around The USMC acknowledges that their desired schedule is aggressive, which often creates testing surprises, delays, and rising costs. Until the ACV is ready, the Amtracs will soldier on. During the next decade, any serious problems in the Amtracs fleet could leave the US Marines in a difficult position indeed. The wheeled Marine Personnel Carrier program is really a replacement for the LAV fleet, and has always been seen as a separate budgeted item.

Developed to replace an aging fleet of amphibious assault vehicles, the Marines will receive a total of 16 vehicles with deliveries to commence in March. The earlier stages of the ACV 1. The five designs have been undergoing testing, with the USMC planning to progress the two downselected bids through a development phase.

Israeli Namer heavy APCs ]. Ricardo, Inc. Work will be performed in Belleville, MI The good news is that the USMC is reaching to a logical and related industry for help. The bad news is that an appetite for more and more based on notional requirements, rather than cost-driven limits that may force rethinks of what one can expect, is what sank EFV in the first place.

Further bad news? The USMC say they need 38 amphibious ships, and might make do with 33, but will get That will push them toward a long-swimming IFV design, as a way of compensating at sea. The question is whether that will create fatal vulnerabilities on land, or whether the shipbuilding sector can offer an EFV idea that squares the circle. See above for more details. Like its predecessor, MPC is required to have some amphibious capability, albeit less than the Amtracs.

If fully executed, the EFV — which costs far more to operate and maintain than its predecessor — would essentially swallow the entire Marine vehicle budget and most of its total procurement budget for the foreseeable future… recent analysis by the Navy and Marine Corps suggests that the most plausible scenarios requiring power projection from the sea could be handled through a mix of existing air and sea systems employed in new ways along with new vehicles… the mounting cost of acquiring this specialized capability must be judged against other priorities and needs.

Let me be clear. We will budget the funds necessary to develop a more affordable and sustainable amphibious tractor to provide the Marines a ship-to-shore capability into the future.

The budget will also propose funds to upgrade the existing amphibious vehicle fleet with new engines, electronics, and armaments to ensure that the Marines will be able to conduct ship-to-shore missions until the next generation of systems is brought on line.

After examining multiple options to preserve the EFV, I concluded that none of the options meets what we consider reasonable affordability criteria. As a result, I decided to pursue a more affordable vehicle… Shortly, we will issue a special notice to industry requesting information relative to supporting our required amphibious capabilities.

Finally, the Deteroit Free Press submits a note worth remembering when other program cancellations are discussed:. In other words, each of those jobs equated to roughly a full time job for one year, or over the course of the program.

The chairmen of the White House deficit commission marked it for termination in their cost-cutting proposal last week. Either the Marines could continue to use their decades-old Amphibious Assault Vehicles, or they can modify their planned Marine Personnel Carrier for ship-to-shore operations. The training system will include several sub-systems: training courseware on a Learning Management System, simulators, devices, mockups, and training aids.

Work will be performed in Orlando, FL, and is expected to be complete by September James Conway defends the EFV capability, while distancing himself a bit from the current program.

Defense Tech quotes him:. See also Aviation Week Reuters. Norman D. Some excerpts:. The rest of their review is quite detailed and specific. It cites serious ongoing issues with capacity and weight, reliability, and maintainability, and sees the overlapping schedule for testing and early production as especially worthy of concern. The USMC rolls out the SDD-2 EFV prototype at a ceremony, and continues to press their case for the vehicle amidst rumors of its cancellation at what turned into a mini pep rally for the vehicle and its supporters.

Taking direct aim at some of the concerns raised recently by Defense Secretary Robert Gates that Marines may not need the EFV or that the vehicle could prove too costly, program and Marine Corps officials said the vehicle is exactly what they need to conduct operations from the sea. The EFV is meant to serve as a vehicle bridge for Marines, carrying them from Navy ships through the surf and sand and miles deep into enemy terrain.

First, what kind of new platform is needed to get large numbers of troops from ship to shore under fire — in other words, the capability provided by the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. But we have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again — especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore.

On a more basic level, in the 21st century, what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how much? And there will continue to be long-term — and inviolable — costs associated with taking care of our troops and their families.

In other words, I do not foresee any significant increases in top-line of the shipbuilding budget beyond current assumptions. At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation can really afford [the current force structure and platforms]. When you actually crunch those numbers, that means a The program is addressing design actions raised during its critical design review in December and plans to incorporate many of them into seven new prototypes currently under construction… An operational assessment is scheduled for April At that time, the program expects to demonstrate on average at least 16 hours of operation between operational mission failures, which will keep the EFV on the reliability path needed to reach its minimum requirement of Additional testing and design revisions are scheduled to continue through the fourth lot of low-rate production, and the program will commit to all four low-rate production lots before conducting initial operational test and evaluation to validate the performance and reliability of the EFV.

No decision has been made on this proposal, but it is being held as an option for later in the program. A single EFV prototype was subjected to 4 blasts, including 2 that simulated land mines, without its additional armor kit installed. Caveat governor.

The non-partisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments CSBA issues a study that recommends cancelling the EFV in favor of an armored vehicle with beter land capabilities and less focus on independent water travel, which would be provided by hovercraft.

It also recommends scaling back MV buys, in favor of a mix of MVs and more standard, less expensive helicopters. Aviation Week Ares. Work includes water maneuvering tests and a gunnery test of it 30mm Mk44 and 7.

In addition, the contractor will modify existing EFV prototypes, procure preliminary spares and repair parts, order long lead materials for the SDD-2 prototypes, and conduct systems engineering, studies and analysis, logistics support and test support. This contract was not competitively awarded. See also Defense News. Work is expected to be completed by September , and will be performed in Woodbridge, Va. The contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Congressman Bartlett:. In February , the program experienced a critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach due primarily to system reliability challenges and a quantity reduction.

The department certified a revised program to Congress in June Work is expected to be complete by September However, General Dynamics Land Systems GDLS has been the sole EFV vehicle designer and developer since and as a result, the main design development and production efforts are planned as sole source to GDLS because no other firm can perform the requirements of development and production without substantial duplication of cost and additional, unacceptable delays to the EFV program.

In addition, they created a Director of Programs position and appointed a senior GDLS employee with proven success on numerous Defense programs to the position. GD then aligned key EFV positions with their corporate organization to provide corporate expertise and continuity across Defense programs. The improvised explosive device IED threat that plagued operations in Iraq and Afghanistan was not envisioned in when the EFV program was initiated. The EFVs low ground clearance and flat bottom make it particularly vulnerable to IEDs this has raised congressional concern that the EFV, as currently designed, would provide inadequate protection to transported Marines.

Another change to the battlefield is the proliferation of longer-ranged, shore-based, antiship cruise missiles ASCMs, which put the Navys amphibious ships disembarking EFVs at their mile operating limit vulnerable to attack. Potential issues for congressional consideration include upgrading current AAVs, possible commercially available vehicles, and a future AAV replacement program.

View the full text of this report. One of those that will be examined closely is the need for a new capability to get large numbers of troops from ship to shore — in other words, the capability provided by the Marine Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle But we have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious action again.

In the 21 st century, how much amphibious capability do we need? While there had been speculation that the EFV might be eliminated by the Quadrennial Defense Review QDR , the report contained no recommendations that the EFV be cancelled or that major amphibious operations capabilities were no longer needed.

It is not known when this review will be completed. The Marines are also conducting a force structure review to determine what the Corps will look like post-Afghanistan to include size and types of equipment needed. While there was no date indicated for study completion, Marine officials maintain that the results of this study will be part of the FY Program Objective Memorandum POM.

On August 12, , it was reported that Secretary of Defense Gates had ordered a review of the future role of the Marine Corps, given the "anxiety" that service in Iraq and Afghanistan had turned the Corps into "a second land army. This review will likely directly address the issue that critics of the EFV frequently cite: that large amphibious assaults on fortified coastlines have become obsolete because of the changing nature of warfare and long-range, precision weapons.

During an October Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Marine leaders reportedly stated that if the EFV failed to show adequate improvement during reliability testing, they would cancel the program and "start over. His rationale is explained below:. The EFV's aggressive requirements list has resulted in an 80, pound armored vehicle that skims the surface of the ocean for long distances at high speeds before transitioning to combat operations on land.

Meeting these demands has, over the years, led to significant technology problems, development delays and cost increases. To fully execute the EFV, which costs far more to operate and maintain than its predecessor, would essentially swallow the entire Marine vehicle budget, and most of its total procurement budget for the foreseeable future.

To be sure, the EFV would, if pursued to completion without regard to time or cost, be an enormously capable vehicle. However, recent analysis by the Navy and Marine Corps suggest that the most plausible scenarios requiring power projection from the sea could be handled through a mix of existing air and sea systems employed in new ways, along with new vehicles, scenarios that do not require the exquisite features of the EFV. As with several other high-end programs cancelled in recent years, the mounting costs of acquiring this specialized capability must be judged against other priorities and needs.

Secretary Gates stated that his decision "does not call into question the Marines' amphibious assault mission. The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that the Marine Corps would "shortly issue a special notice to industry requesting information relative to supporting our required amphibious capabilities. Reports suggest that Secretary Gates's decision to cancel the EFV could face congressional opposition. Other Members have also suggested that the EFV cancellation would lead to eliminating hundreds of high-skilled manufacturing jobs as well as hurting local economies in states and districts associated with the EFV program.

Reportedly, a number of letters have been sent by Members to the President and Secretary of Defense Gates opposing the recommendation to cancel the program. Even if the EFV program can not be saved, some Members suggest that ongoing EFV testing and associated activities should be fully funded and continued so that "technology can be harvested from the EFV program" and applied to any future amphibious vehicle development. In terms of the ACV, the Marines are looking for a vehicle that will carry a squad-sized force from a mile minimum distance from shore and be able to maneuver with Marine mechanized units while maintaining a counter-IED capability.

One evaluation criteria could be the EFV's overall performance in operational testing, which is in its final stages. While General Dynamics claims that current testing is reportedly "exceeding requirements by 90 percent," 57 the Marines have not yet issued their final test results. Another issue for consideration is if the technologically advanced EFV now fits in with the Marines' planned restructuring to what it describes as a "middle weight force" with less equipment that it currently possesses.

If the EFV program is terminated as Secretary Gates intends, there could likely be two decades-worth of knowledge and associated technologies, which could be a major benefit—as well as potential cost savings—for the AAV upgrade and ACV programs. This examination could help to ensure that there is "value added" by these technologies and that they meet "cost-benefit" criteria—in other words, these technologies meet ACV key performance parameters KPPs and are not expensive "nice to have" features that could potentially drive up the ACV per unit cost.

Congress might wish to review whether the Marines' plan to field the ACV in four years is overly ambitious. It is not known if this four-year requirement is based on a specific operational need or if it is driven by other factors. Because of the wide disparity in expectations for the delivery date of the ACV, it might be beneficial to take a comprehensive look at the requirements and expected resources available to the Marines to ensure that a four-year development cycle is not both overly optimistic and ambitious.

While the Marines certainly cannot afford another two-decades long developmental effort, some believe that they cannot afford to rush ACV development and testing in order to meet an arbitrary timeline. Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Sydney J. Activities during this phase include defining key design characteristics and expected capabilities and demonstrating that technologies can be incorporated into systems designs. Prototype systems are developed during this phase.